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ABSTRACT:
This paper explores how debt accumulation is affected by the strategic interactions between
monetary and fiscal authorities. To achieve the second best with a dependent central bank, the
government needs to be made both more conservative and more impatient. However, in the absence
of political distortions, an optimally designed conservative, independent central bank is sufficient to
establish the second best. In the presence of political distortions, however, also an optimal debt
target is needed.
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This second perspective on debt accumulation is closely related to the literature investigating how the
1
term structure of public debt can help to establish the optimal commitment equilibrium. See, e.g., Lucas and
Stokey (1983), Persson and Svensson (1984), Persson, Persson and Svensson (1987), Calvo and Obstfeld
(1990) and Calvo and Guidotti (1992).
In Obstfeld (1991a,b), time-inconsistency originates in money demand, which depends on expected
2
inflation. Our model, in contrast, is in the tradition of Barro and Gordon (1983a,b). In particular, non-indexed
nominal wages are the source of time inconsistency.
For the interactions between monetary and fiscal policies in a closed economy, see Sargent and Wallace
3
(1981), Tabellini (1986), Alesina and Tabellini (1987), Debelle (1993), Levine and Pearlman (1992), Levine
(1993), Debelle and Fischer (1994), Levine and Brociner (1994) and Krichel, Levine and
Pearlman (1994).
1. Introduction
Many countries have experienced substantial increases in public debt over the past two
decades. The academic literature has explored public debt accumulation from two different
perspectives. One perspective views public debt as a strategic instrument employed by current
governments to affect the policies chosen by future governments. Persson and Svensson (1989),
Aghion and Bolton (1989) and Alesina and Tabellini (1990) provide illustrations of this approach.
Another strand of the literature explores the incentives to accumulate public debt by governments
that are unable to commit to an announced inflation rate. Obstfeld (1991a,b) demonstrates that, in
the absence of commitment, governments may want to accumulate public assets in order to
eliminate the incentives to generate unanticipated inflation, thereby enhancing the credibility of
anti-inflation policies.
1
This paper links both strands of the literature by studying the accumulation of public debt
both for strategic reasons as well as the purpose of building up credibility. After presenting our
two-period model in Section 2, the analysis is conducted in three steps. First, as a benchmark case,
Section 3 considers a single, centralized, benevolent policymaker who selects both fiscal and
monetary policy and who is able to commit. This benchmark case corresponds to the second-best
equilibrium (i.e. the Pareto optimum in the absence of lump-sum taxes).
Section 4 takes the second step by assuming discretion rather than commitment. Debt
policy is now affected by the so-called credibility effect (conform Obstfeld, 1991a,b), which
2
induces the government to accumulate additional public assets in order to reduce inflation
expectations in the future. In this way, the accumulation of public assets enhances the credibility of
future anti-inflation policies.
The final step, taken in Section 5, extends Obstfeld's (1991a,b) analysis by allowing for
decentralized monetary policymaking by an independent central bank, which lacks the ability to
commit. This allows us to explore the strategic interaction between fiscal and monetary authorities.
3
With centralized decision making, the inability to commit unambiguously reduces the accumulation
of public debt. With decentralized decision making, in contrast, public debt may be boosted by the
strategic interaction between the fiscal and monetary authorities. In particular, if the central bank is
too conservative from the ex-ante perspective of the fiscal authority, the latter accumulates
2additional debt to encourage the central bank to produce higher future inflation. However, if the
first-period fiscal authorities do not find the central bank conservative enough, they strategically
reduce debt accumulation to induce the central bank to decrease inflation in the future. In this way,
rather paradoxically, the discretionary equilibrium may result in a better performance in terms of
long-run price stability than the commitment equilibrium, which produces less inflation in the short
run. This result is closely related to Sargent and Wallace (1981) who show, with exogenously given
fiscal policy, that tighter monetary control in the short run may boost inflation in the longer run.
We demonstrate how this result may continue to hold in a explicit game-theoretic framework in
which both monetary and fiscal policy are endogenously determined.
The strategic interaction between monetary and fiscal aurhorities in a dynamic framework
allows us to deal with not only positive issues (including the impact on public debt and inflation
over time) but also normative issues. In particular, the inability to commit gives rise to two
additional sources of welfare losses compared to the second best. One, familiar source is
intratemporal: the monetary authorities attempt to alleviate distortions in the real economy by
stimulating output through unanticipated inflation. With the private sector anticipating these
attempts, however, monetary policy is ineffective in boosting output in equilibrium. Accordingly,
the equilibrium inflation rate exceeds the socially optimal rate.
The other, less familiar, source of welfare loss produced by discretionary policy involves
the intertemporal distribution of distortionary losses. From the perspective of a discretionary
policymaker who sets policy in the first period, first-period expectations are pre-determined. The
corresponding expectations in the second period, in contrast, still have to be determined and thus
can be affected by policy. This induces the policymaker to use unanticipated inflation in the first
period, thereby in effect exploiting the exogenous first-period inflation expectations, to impact
inflation expectations in the second period. However, in equilibrium, the private sector correctly
anticipates these incentives facing policymakers to use first-period unanticipated inflation in this
way. In a dynamic model, therefore, the inability to commit yields not only intra- but also
intertemporal distortions.
These welfare losses can be eliminated by properly designed institutions. Adjusting
monetary policy preferences is the most direct way to deal with the distortions due to the inability
to commit. Indeed, with an independent central bank (i.e. decentralized monetary policymaking) and
in the absence of political distortions, both sources of welfare loss vanish if the central bank's price
stability weight is adjusted optimally. Intuitively, the incentive facing the first-period fiscal
authorities to use debt policy strategically originates in sub-optimal monetary policies in the second
period. If the central bank features the optimal preferences from a social point of view, the fiscal
authorities no longer perceive the need to use debt policy to bring future monetary policy closer to
the optimum. With a dependent central bank (i.e. centralized policymaking), the government needs
to be made not only more inflation averse than an independent central bank but also more
impatient than society.
3For similar approaches, see Alesina and Tabellini (1987), Debelle (1993), Debelle and Fischer (1994)
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and Jensen (1994).
If political distortions cause the preferences of the fiscal authorities to depart from those of
society, an optimally designed, conservative independent central bank is no longer sufficient to
reach the second best. Intuitively, changing monetary institutions is not the proper instrument to
deal with imperfect fiscal institutions. Indeed, to achieve the second best in the presence of political
distortions, not only monetary but also fiscal institutions should be dealt with. In particular,
properly adjusting the price stability weight of the central bank removes the distortions due to the
inability to commit while debt ceilings avoid excessive debt accumulation by myopic fiscal
authorities who are more impatient than society or by opportunistic authorities who care less about
price stability than society does. In this way, institutional arrangements for monetary and fiscal
policy are targetted directly at the distortions due to the inability to commit and the existence of
imperfect fiscal institutions.
If fiscal instruments, including debt ceilings, are not available, monetary institutions have
to deal with fiscal imperfections. If fiscal authorities are more impatient than society, for example,
the central bank should be made less conservative than in the absence of political distortions. This
in order to encourage the myopic fiscal authorities to restrain debt accumulation so as to enhance
the credibility of monetary policy. Accordingly, monetary policy is distracted from its primary
mission (i.e. price stability) because it is used as an indirect instrument to deal with imperfections
in fiscal policy. This explains why central bankers are strong advocates of ceilings on public debt
when designing institutions for the European Monetary Union (EMU).
2. The model
This section formulates a two-period model with homogeneous product markets and a
unionized labour market. Within this framework, we set up a game between three players: a union
representing workers and two policy authorities, namely a fiscal authority (the government) and a
monetary authority (the central bank).
2.1. Output and preferences
The sole objective of unions is to achieve a target real wage rate, the logarithm of which
we normalize to zero. Therefore, the (log) of the nominal wage rate in period t is set equal to the
4
(rationally) expected (log) price level in period t, p . Nominal wage contracts are signed beforet
e
policy is selected. Unions thus act as Stackelberg leaders vis-à-vis policymakers.
Output is given by Y = L (0<0<1), where L is labor, and is taxed at a rate J . Thet t t t
0
representative firm selects employment so as to maximize profits P L (1-J )-WL , where P and Wt t t t t t t
0
4Employment is directly related to output through the production function. Hence, instead of output,
5
employment could have been included as an argument in the loss function, with the target employment level
corresponding to the output level in absence of any distortions.
denote the price level and the wage rate, respectively. Hence, (log) output is given by y = (0/(1-t
0))(B -B -J +log0), where B is the inflation rate and B the expected inflation rate. Fort t t t t
e e
convenience, we normalize output by subtracting the constant (0/(1-0))log0 from y . Hence,t
normalized output, x , amounts tot
x = <(B -B -J ), </0/(1-0). (2.1)t t t t
e
Without tax distortions, x =0 in a rational expectations equilibrium (where inflation ist
anticipated, i.e. B =B , see (2.1)). In addition to distortionary output taxes, we allow for other, non-t t
e
tax, distortions due to, for example, union power in the labor market or monopoly power in
commodity markets. The first-best output level, i.e. output with neither tax nor non-tax distortions,
is denoted by x . Thus, x >0 measures the non-tax distortions and can be interpreted as an implicitt t
tax on output. In fact, by offsetting the implicit output tax, an output subsidy (J =-x /<) can raiset t
output towards its first-best level x .t
Society features a social welfare function that differs from the objectives of the unions
because the social welfare function accounts for the preferences of not only workers but also non-
workers. In particular, society's preferences, defined over inflation, output and public spending, are
represented by the following loss function,
V = ½ 3 $ [" B + (x -x ) + " (g -g ) ], 0<$ #1, " ," >0. (2.2)S t=1 S BS t t t gS t t S BS gS
2 t-1 2 2 2
Welfare losses increase in the deviations of inflation, (log) output and government spending (g ist
government spending as a share of non-distortionary output) from their targets (or first-best levels
or 'bliss points'). The target level of inflation corresponds to price stability. The non-distortionary
5
output level, x , represents the bliss point for output. The first-best level of government spending,t
g , can be interpreted as the optimal share of non-distortionary output to be spent on public goodst
if (non-distortionary) lump-sum taxes would be available (see Debelle and Fischer, 1994). The
parameters " and " correspond to the weights of the price stability and government spending
BS gS
objectives, respectively, relative to the output objective. The limiting case of " 64 corresponds togS
the situation where government spending is exogenously fixed at g. Finally, $ denotes society'sS
subjective discount factor.
Preferences of the fiscal and monetary authorities are likewise given by, respectively,
V = ½ 3 $ [" B + (x -x ) + " (g -g ) ], 0<$ #1 and " >0. (2.3)F t=1 F BF t t t gS t t F BF
2 t-1 2 2 2
and
V = ½ 3 $ [" B + (x -x ) + " (g -g ) ], " >0. (2.4)M t=1 S BM t t t gS t t BM
2 t-1 2 2 2
5Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) show explicitly how the degree of political instability affects
6
the effective rate of time preference of the government in a model in which the choice of the efficiency of the
tax structure plays a similar strategic role as debt does in this paper.
This is the rate of return on public debt required by a risk neutral investor who has an outside
7
investment opportunity paying a real rate of return D.
Alesina and Tabellini (1987), Debelle (1993) and Jensen (1994), among others, assume that 6=1.8
However, as will become clear below, non-unitary values for 6 play an important role in our analysis.
The price stability weights of the two policy authorities do not have to coincide. Moreover, these
weights can differ from society's price stability weight. A policymaker with a higher price stability
weight will be termed to be more conservative. Political distortions are present if the government's
preferences depart from society's. In particular, a government that cares less about inflation than
society does (i.e. " <" ) is called opportunistic. A government is myopic if its subjective discount
BF BS
factor is lower than that of society (i.e $ <$ ). Such a high rate of time preference may be due to,F S
for example, a high probability of being voted out of office at the end of the first period.
6
2.2. The government financing requirement
The government budget constraint in each period is given by (see, e.g., Beetsma and
Bovenberg, 1995)
g + (1+D)d = J + 6B + d , t=1,2, (2.5)t t-1 t t t
where D denotes the (constant) real interest rate and J and 6$0 represent, respectively,7 t
distortionary tax revenue and real money holdings as shares of (non-distortionary) output.
8
Seigniorage revenues equal 6B . Furthermore, d stands for the stock of public debt carried overt t-1
from the previous period, while d denotes newly issued public debt. All public debt is real andt
matures after one period. Moreover, all debt is paid off at the end of the second period (i.e. d =0).2
The government budget constraint in both periods can be consolidated into a single
intertemporal government budget constraint,
(1+D)d + g + g /(1+D) = J +6B + (J +6B )/(1+D). (2.6)0 1 2 1 1 2 2
The left-hand side of (2.6) represents discounted public spending (including repayment of
the initial stock of debt). Discounted public revenues are given by the right-hand side of (2.6). For
later convenience, we derive what we term the government financing requirement, by rewriting
(2.5) as
GFR / K + (1+D)d - d = [J +x /<] + 6B + [g -g ], where K / g +x /<. (2.7)t t t-1 t t t t t t t t t
6The government financing requirement (GFR ) amounts to the government spending target g , at t
labor subsidy aimed at offsetting the implicit tax on output, x /<, and the cost of servicingt
outstanding public debt net of newly issued debt, (1+D)d -d . The last right-hand side of (2.7)t-1 t
represents the sources of finance: explicit and implicit tax revenues, J +x /<, seigniorage revenues,t t
6B , and the shortfall of government spending from its target, g -g .t t t
If we take the discounted (to period 1) sums of the left and right hand sides of (2.7) (for
t=1,2), we obtain the intertemporal government financing requirement,
F / (1+D)d + K + K /(1+D) = 3 (1+D) [(J +x /<)+6B +(g -g )]. (2.8)0 1 2 t=1 t t t t t
2 -(t-1)
7In the discretionary equilibria analyzed below, in contrast, first-period expectations are perceived to be
9
exogenously given when policy is set in the first period. The same holds true for the second period
expectations when policies are set in the second period.
Appendix A provides a complete derivation of the equilibrium outcomes.
10
3. Centralized policymaking with commitment
In this section, the central bank is dependent. Accordingly, the government selects not only
tax rates and public spending but also inflation. Furthermore, as a benchmark for the more realistic,
discretionary equilibria analyzed below, this section assumes that the government is able to commit.
The government thus credibly announces its monetary policy each period before expectations are
formed. Therefore, expectations are perceived to be endogenous not only in the second but also in
the first period, so that the government takes into account the rational expectations constraint
(B =B ) in both periods. With a benevolent government (i.e. a government that shares society'st t
e 9
preferences), commitment leads to the second best (i.e. the Pareto optimum in absence of lump-sum
taxes).
We can solve for the commitment equilibrium by working backwards in time. The policy
10
outcomes and welfare losses in the second period are computed for given d , and therefore coincide1
with the corresponding outcomes in what we will refer to in the following as the static (version of
the) model (i.e. the single-period version of the model with an exogenous stock of public debt d ;1
see Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1995). The government's second period welfare losses are (given d1
and given that the second period policy instruments are selected optimally) is ½P [ K +(1+D)d ] ,-1 22 1
where P/6 /" +1/< +1/" . Hence, substituting (2.1) into (2.3) and imposing B =B , the first-2 2 e
BF gS 1 1
period Lagrangian, to be optimized over B , J , g and d , amounts to1 1 1 1
£ = ½[" B + (<J +x ) + " (g -g ) ] + ½$ P [ K +(1+D)d ] +
BF 1 1 1 gS 1 1 F 2 1
2 2 2 -1 2
8 [g +(1+D)d -J -6B -d ], (3.1)1 1 0 1 1 1
where 8 represents the marginal costs of public funds (i.e. the Lagrange multiplier of the1
government budget constraint). Optimizing the Lagrangian above, we arrive at the following first-
order conditions for inflation, taxation, public spending and public debt, respectively,
" B = 8 6, (3.2)
BF 1 1
<(<J +x ) = 8 , (3.3)1 1 1
" (g -g ) = 8 , (3.4)gS 1 1 1
$ P [ K +(1+D)d ](1+D) = 8 . (3.5)F 2 1 1
-1
Public debt
Combining (3.2)-(3.4) with the government financing requirement (2.7) for the first period, we find
8The model predicts that the financing sources of the government move jointly over time (cf. Mankiw,
11
1987).
<(<J +x )=P [ K +(1+D)d -d ]. Substituting this into (3.3) and combining with (3.5), we arrive at1 1 1 0 1
-1
[ K +(1+D)d -d ] = $ (1+D)[ K +(1+D)d ]. (3.6)1 0 1 F 2 1
The left hand side of (3.6) represents the marginal benefit in the first period of issuing more debt,
while the right hand side represents the (discounted) marginal cost in the form of larger
distortionary losses in the second period on account of the higher debt servicing costs. Other things
equal, the discounted cost is lower, the lower the discount factor $ . Due to the quadraticF
specification of the loss function, the marginal benefit (in the first period) associated with an
increase in debt at the end of the first period is decreasing in d , while the marginal cost (in the1
second period) of such an increase is increasing in d .1
We can rewrite (3.6) as follows:
[$ (1+D)+1] d = [ K +(1+D)d - K ] + (1-$ ) K , where $ /$ (1+D). (3.7)F 1 1 0 2 F 2 F F
* * *
The right hand side of (3.7) reveals the two determinants of debt accumulation under commitment.
The term between square brackets represents the so-called smoothing effect. This effect raises
(reduces) d whenever the exogenous component of the government financing requirement in the1
first period, K +(1+D)d , exceeds (falls short of) the exogenous component of the government1 0
financing requirement in period two, K .2
The second term at the right hand side of (3.7) stands for the intertemporal substitution
effect. This effect raises (reduces) public debt if impatience as measured by the subjective rate of
time preference exceeds (falls short of) the rate of return on assets. For later convenience, we note
from (3.7) that d is decreasing in $ , i.e. Md /M$ <0.1 F 1 F
* *
Inflation, taxes, and public spending
The policy outcomes are contained in Table 1. The shares of the government financing
requirement (GFR) absorbed by seigniorage (6B ), the sum of explicit and implicit taxes (J +x /<)t t t
and the public spending gap (g -g ) are the same in each period and are, in fact, equal to thet t
corresponding shares in the static version of the model (see Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1995, Table 1
(where <=1)). If $ =1, the government financing requirements are perfectly smoothed out over bothF
*
periods. Hence, inflation, total taxes and the public spending gap are constant over time. If $ <1,F
*
first-period welfare losses are relatively important compared to the return on assets. Accordingly,
inflation, seigniorage, taxes and the government spending are rising over time.
11
Welfare
1
2P
˜K1%(1%D)d0&ˆd1 2%$S ˜K2%(1%D)ˆd1 2 .
ˆd opt1 '
˜K1%(1%D)d0& ˜K2%(1&$(S) ˜K2
$
(
S(1%D)%1
, where $(S/$S(1%D).
9
The function (1+D) (z +$ )/(z(1+D)+1) is decreasing in z for z<$ (1+D), increasing for z>$ (1+D) and,12 2 2 2
S S S
hence, attains a global minimum for z=$ (1+D). Therefore, the second component of the welfare loss is
S
minimized for $ =$ (1+D)=$ (1+D), hence for $ =$ .
F F S F S
*
d does not interact with the intratemporal allocation of distortions. Therefore, (3.9) describes the
13
1
optimal debt target also if the policymaker is opportunistic (" <" ).
BF BS
Society's discounted social welfare loss contained in Table 2 is derived by substituting the
policy outcomes from Table 1 into expression (2.2) and using that, in equilibrium, B =B , t=1,2.t t
e
The term between the first square brackets in the welfare expression in Table 2 stems from the
intratemporal distribution of distortionary losses and reaches a minimum for " =" . The term
BF BS
between the second square brackets (i.e. * (($ ) +$ ), where * /(1+D)/($ (1+D)+1) and $ /$ ,C C S C C C F
2 * 2 * * *
and where the subscript C denotes the regime of "centralized commitment") orginates in the
intertemporal distribution of distortionary losses and reaches a minimum for $ =$ . Hence, withF S
12
commitment, the second best (i.e. the Pareto optimum in absence of lump-sum taxes) is reached if
the government's preferences coincide with society's. Political distortions result in additional
welfare losses.
The optimal debt target
In the United States, a number of recent proposals have been put forward to balance the
federal public budget. Furthermore, the Maastricht treaty includes ceilings on public debt as
entrance requirements for the EMU. We now explore the welfare effects of a debt target within the
framework of our model. In the presence of a target d on public indebtedness, the government1
solves two single period optimisation problems with exogenous government financing requirements
K +(1+D)d -d and K +(1+D)d in the first and second period, respectively. Given that inflation,1 0 1 2 1
taxes and public spending are selected optimally by the policymaker in each period, society's
discounted welfare loss amounts to
(3.8)
A lower debt target d shifts welfare losses from the second towards the first period. The optimal1
debt target minimises the term between brackets and is thus given by
13
(3.9)
In fact, a debt target equal to d implies an optimal intertemporal allocation of distortions, so that1
opt
the economy attains the second best if " =" . For a government featuring a discount factor $ =$ ,
BF BS F S
d equals d implied by (3.7). Hence, in the absence of political distortions, arbitrary (in contrast1 1
opt
to the optimal) debt targets are costly. With myopic policymakers, however, the imposition of the
optimal debt enhances welfare by protecting society from excessive debt accumulation by a myopic
10
policymaker ($ <$ ).F S
4. Centralized policymaking with discretion
In this section, the central policymaker is not able to commit. When discretionary policies
are selected in the first period, inflation expectations for that period are taken to be exogenously
given because the private sector acts as a Stackelberg leader in concluding nominal wage contracts.
However, expectations of second period inflation still need to be formed and, hence, can be affected
by first-period policy. Indeed, as we will see below, the government may want to use its debt
policy to affect second-period inflation expectations.
Public debt
Employing a similar procedure as in the case of centralized commitment (in Section 3), we
find the optimal debt level from the following first-order condition for public debt:
[ K +(1+D)d -d ] = $ (1+D)(D /D)[ K +(1+D)d ], (4.1)1 0 1 F 2 1
*
where D/6(6+1)/" +1/< +1/" and D /(6+1) /" +1/< +1/" . As in the corresponding expression
BF gS BF gS
2 * 2 2
(3.6) in Section 3, the left-hand side of (4.1) represents the marginal benefit (in period one) from
issuing more debt, while the right-hand side stands for the marginal cost (in period two). By
comparing (3.6) from the commitment equilibrium with (4.1) from the discretionary equilibrium, we
observe that discretionary debt accumulation is affected by another effect in addition to the
smoothing and intertemporal substitution effects. This so-called credibility effect, which arises from
the inability to commit, is represented by the factor D /D>1 at the right-hand side of (4.1). This
*
factor effectively increases the discount factor, thereby raising the second-period costs associated
with additional debt. Therefore, with centralisation, the stock of public debt, d , is in general lower1
under discretion than under commitment (recall that Md /M$ <0).1 F
*
The intuition for the lower stock of debt in the discretionary equilibrium is the following
(see also Obstfeld, 1991a,b). Whereas first-period inflation expectations are perceived as given by
the policymaker when selecting debt policy, second-period inflation expectations can still be
affected. Hence, to reduce the "stock of credibility problems" in the second period, as measured by
the government financing requirement K +(1+D)d , the government reduces public debt, thereby2 1
mitigating the inflationary bias in the second period. In other words, the government trades off
additional distortionary losses in the first period against gains in credibility of monetary policy in
the second period.
The inability to commit exerts a large effect on debt policy if anti-inflation monetary policy
is not very credible. A steep slope of the Phillips curve (i.e. a large <) harms the credibility of anti-
inflation policies because it raises the boost to output from inflation surprises. Accordingly, it
$
(
F(1%D)
$
(
F(1%D)%1
6(6%1)
"
BS(1/<2%1/"gS)
> 1.
11
This is related to a result on optimal capital taxation due to Chamley (1986). He finds that the optimal
14
policy of a government is to reduce the tax rate on capital over time. The reason is that the initial stock of
capital is inelastically supplied. Here, a similar effect arises. Since inflation expectations in existing wage
contracts are perceived to be "inelastic", the government finds it optimal to impose a high initial inflation
tax, which contributes to the accumulation of assets and builds up credibility of future policy. However, our
set up differs fundamentally from that of Chamley (1986). In particular, policies are time consistent in the
current model because inflation expectations are endogenous and rational in equilibrium. Hence, the private
sector correctly anticipates the incentives of the public sector to impose a high inflation tax in the short run.
This is in contrast to Chamley (1986), who assumes that the stock of capital is exogenously fixed in the short
run and thus not affected by the incentive facing the government to tax the capital stock in the short run. In
Chamley (1986), who assumes commitment, the derived policy is socially optimal, given the absence of lump-
sum taxes. As is explained below, the time-consistent equilibrium derived in the current paper is not optimal.
requires more asset accumulation to build up credibility. Similarly, a high priority for public
spending (i.e. a large weight " ), by requiring higher output taxes, raises the incentive to usegS
unanticipated inflation to alleviate tax distortions and, hence, also boosts asset accumulation. High
priority to price stability (i.e. a large weight " ) raises second-period credibility of low inflation
BF
policies, thereby reducing the need to accumulate public assets (note that $ /$ (1+D)(D /D) isD F
* *
decreasing in " ). In fact, if " 64, second period inflation and, therefore, also the second period
BF BF
inflation bias, are zero, irrespective of the size of the government financing requirement. In that
case, the first-period government sees no need to accumulate assets for the purpose of building up
credibility. In other words, a high price stability weight of the government substitutes for asset
accumulation in enhancing the credibility of second-period monetary policy.
Inflation
The accumulation of public assets shifts distortionary losses from the second to the first
period. In the special case of K = K , d =0 and $ =1, policy variables are constant over time under1 2 0 F
*
commitment. Under discretion, in contrast, inflation and taxation are falling over time while
14
government spending and output are rising.
Assume for the moment that " =" . In the static version of the model, inflation is higher
BF BS
under discretion than under commitment. However, the incentive to build up additional public
assets in the dynamic model of this paper implies that distortionary losses are shifted away from
the second to the first period. This may reverse the "standard" ranking. In particular, second-period
inflation is lower under discretion than under commitment, if (see Appendix B),
(4.2)
This condition is met if the negative effect on second-period inflation associated with the
accumulation of public assets on account of the credibility effect dominates the familiar inflation
bias due to discretion. Accordingly, condition (4.2) is more likely to be met if the credibility effect
is important. As explained above, this is the case if the Phillips curve is steep and society attaches
a low priority to price stability compared to public spending. Large money holdings, 6, make
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Condition (4.2) is more likely to be met also if the policymaker is more patient, so that he attaches
15
more weight to second period welfare losses. In that case, most of the intertemporal financing requirement is
met in the first period so that a shift in the financing requirement from the second towards the first period
exerts a relatively large impact on second-period policy outcomes.
To derive this inequality, we use footnote 11.
16
condition (4.2) easier to satisfy by reducing the importance of the traditional inflation bias under
discretion. In particular, even under commitment, authorities rely relatively heavily on seigniorage
15
to cover their financing requirement if money holdings are large. More generally, condition (4.2)
reveals that tighter short-run monetary policy (under commitment) may yield higher inflation
(compared to discretion) in the long run if large money holdings imply that inflation exerts
powerful effects on the public finances.
Welfare
An expression for the welfare loss is contained in Table 2. Just like in the commitment
case, the welfare loss can be decomposed in intratemporal losses (the term in the first square
brackets) and an intertemporal losses (the term in the second square brackets).
If the government's preferences coincide with society's, both of these losses under
discretion exceed the corresponding second-best losses under commitment. As regards the
intratemporal loss, we have
(4.3)
where the left-hand and right-hand sides represent the intratemporal losses under discretion and
commitment, respectively. The additional intratemporal losses under discretion originate in the
incentives of the government to employ inflation surprises as an instrument to alleviate tax
distortions. The private sector correctly anticipates these incentives of the government to exploit
nominal contracts. In this way, the interaction between the government, which cannot commit to a
low-inflation policy, and the public, which correctly anticipates inflation, generates an inflation
bias.
Wheras the intratemporal welfare loss due to discretion is relatively familiar from the
literature, the second, intertemporal welfare loss is less well known. The following inequality
indicates the suboptimality of the intertemporal allocation under discretion
16
(4.4)
13
where $ is defined in Table 1 and evaluated at " =" and $ =$ , while $ is defined in (3.9).D BF BS F S S
* *
The intuition for the additional intertemporal welfare losses produced by discretion is as follows.
From the perspective of a discretionary policymaker who sets policy in the first period, first-period
expectations are pre-determined. The corresponding expectations in the second period, in contrast,
still have to be determined and thus can be affected by (debt) policy. This induces the policymaker
to rely relatively heavily on first-period financing, among other things in the form of unanticipated
inflation, in order to reduce inflation expectations in the second period. However, in equilibrium,
the private sector correctly anticipates the incentives of the government to use inflation surprises in
the first period so as to build up assets in order to enhance the credibility of monetary policy in the
second period. Hence, the discretionary equilibrium suffers from an asset bias associated with an
excessive reliance on first-period sources of financing (if $ =$ ). From society's point of view,F S
inflation expectations are endogenous in not only the second period but also the first period. Hence,
as under commitment, only smoothing of distortions and inter-temporal substitution effects (and not
the credibility effect) should determine optimal debt policy.
Optimal institutions
To establish the second best, two additional distortions should offset, respectively, the
intratemporal and the intertemporal misallocation of distortionary losses. As in the static version of
the model, the optimal intratemporal trade-off is attained if
" =" /" (6+1)/6. (4.5)
BF BF BS
opt
This value of " minimises the intratemporal welfare losses (i.e. the term in the first pair of square
BF
brackets in Table 2). The government has to be made more conservative than society (i.e. more
inflation averse as measured by a higher value of " ) in order to offset the inflation bias due to
BF
discretion (see Rogoff, 1985).
In contrast to the static model and also in contrast to the case with decentralized decision
making analyzed in Section 5 below, fiscal policy still does not face the correct incentives, even if
the degree of inflation aversion is corrected according to (4.5). Intuitively, the adjustment of
monetary preferences distorts intertemporal decisions. In particular, given their high inflation
aversion (set according to (4.5)), the policymakers still perceive an inflationary bias in the second
period, even though inflation is optimal from the point of view of society, which features a lower
price stability weight than policymakers. Hence, they accumulate assets to bring inflation
performance in the second period in line with their own preferences rather than those of society.
The intertemporal distortions can be eliminated in two ways. One is to adjust the subjective
discount factor of the policymaker (for example, by an appropriate choice of the probability of
dismissal after the first period). In particular, the second best is reached, if, in addition to (4.5), we
set
$
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If $ =$ , (3.9) puts a limit on asset accumulation rather than debt accumulation as advocated in the17 F S
Maastricht Treaty for an EMU or in the proposed balanced budget amendments in the United States.
However, a debt ceiling may be desirable if $ is much lower than $ .F S
(4.6)
The government thus must be made less patient than society. If governments are myopic (due to,
e.g., short election cycles), this does not imply that the government necessarily has to be made less
patient than it in fact is. In particular, (4.6) requires an increase in the degree of patience if
governments are much less patient than society and if the optimal discount factor does not depart
much from society's (so that $ <$ ). This latter condition is met if money holdings are small, theF F
opt
Philipscurve is relatively flat, and society attaches a high priority to price stability and a low
priority to public spending. Under these conditions, the credibility effect is only small because
policymakers do not perceive much of a need to enhance the credibility of future anti-inflation
policies. These conditions for the credibility effect to be small are likely to be met in modern
democracies, which tend to be characterized by small money holdings, large inflation aversion
(Collins and Giavazzi, 1993), and impatient authorities due to short election cycles.
A second way to correct the intertemporal trade-off is to impose a debt target. The optimal
debt target, which can be found by the minimisation of an expression similar to (3.8) (see
Appendix C) can be chosen independently from the optimal inflation weight (4.5). Again, the
optimal debt target is given by the optimal amount of debt d under commitment (3.9). In1
combination with the adjustment of " to " according to (4.5), the debt target yields the second
BF BF
opt
best.
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5. Decentralized policymaking with an independent central bank
In this section, policymaking is decentralized. In particular, the government takes as given
the current inflation rate and selects only taxes, public spending and public debt. Monetary policy
is delegated to an independent central banker, who is unable to commit and who selects the
inflation rate, taking as given the policy choices of the government. In this case, the fiscal authority
in the first period acts as a leader vis-à-vis the three players (including itself) in the second period.
Hence, as we will see below, the fiscal authority may want to use debt strategically in the first
period in order to affect expectations and policy decisions in the second period.
Public debt accumulation
15
These results on decentralized discretion contrast sharply with those on centralized discretion. In
18
particular, Section 4 showed that with centralized discretion the government always reduces debt to affect
future inflation expectations (see also Obstfeld, 1991a,b). With decentralized discretion, in contrast, the
government may want to raise rather than reduce debt for this purpose.
The strategic use of debt in a dynamic model implies that the price stability weight of the government
19
affects the equilibrium and, in particular, the inflation performance. In the static model, in contrast, the price
stability weight of the government does not affect the decentralized equilibrium with discretion (see Beetsma
and Bovenberg, 1995).
A full derivation of the equilibrium is contained in Appendix D. As before, the
government sets the optimal debt level d by equating the marginal benefit and the marginal cost1
from issuing more debt
[ K +(1+D)d -d ] = $ (1+D)(N /N )[ K +(1+D)d ], (5.1)1 0 1 F D D 2 1
*
where N /6/" +1/< +1/" and N /" /" +1/< +1/" . Debt accumulation is again characterizedD BM gS D BF BM gS
2 * 2 2
by the smoothing and intertemporal substitution effects. In particular, if " /" =6 (and, hence,
BF BM
N /N =1), debt accumulation coincides with that under centralized commitment.D D
*
As in the case of centralized discretion, however, a third effect impacts debt policy. This
so-called strategic effect orginates in disagreement between the first-period fiscal authority and the
second-period monetary authority about second-period inflation. This disagreement causes the fiscal
authority in the first period to strategically employ debt policy in order to affect second-period
monetary policy.
For example, if the government cares much less about inflation than the monetary authority
does (so that " /" <6 and, hence, N /N <1, thereby reducing the effective discount factor of the
BF BM D D
*
fiscal authority, $ /$ N /N , below $ ), the government strategically raises debt in the firstND F D D F
* * * *
period in order to encourage the central bank to raise inflation in the second period. Higher debt
18
raises second-period inflation because the associated higher debt service requires higher taxes in the
second period. This reduces second-period output, thereby tempting the central bank to boost
output by the way of unanticipated inflation.
19
If the fiscal authority attaches a sufficiently high priority to price stability (compared to
that of the central bank), the fiscal authority may want to reduce rather than raise debt strategically.
In particular, the government reduces debt strategically if the central bank is not conservative
enough from the ex-ante perspective of the fiscal authority (i.e. " /" >6 and, hence, N /N >1) so
BF BM D D
*
that second-period monetary policy suffers from an inflation bias from that ex-ante perspective. In
that case, as a substitute for a sufficiently conservative central bank, the government reduces public
debt in order to establish the credibility of anti-inflation policies in the second period.
This suggests that the government accumulates more debt if a conservative, independent
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The result that a more conservative central bank raises debt accumulation appears in other places in the
20
literature (see, e.g., Tabellini, 1986).
Indeed, for high values of " , a further increase in " raises $ , thereby increasing asset21 *
BM BM ND
accumulation and thus reinforcing the downward pressure of the intratemporal effect of an increase in " on
BM
second-period inflation. Appendix F establishes that second-period inflation is increasing in " for
BM
" <" , decreasing in " for " >" and, hence, reaches a global maximum if " =" , where " /
BM BM BM BM BM BM BM BM
* * * *
{[$ (1+D)" ]/[(1+$ (1+D))(1/< +1/" )]} .S BF S gS
* * 2 ½
central bank reduces the need to establish the credibility of anti-inflation policies. To explore this
20
issue, we compare debt accumulation under decentralized and centralized discretion. An
independent central bank (i.e. decentralized policymaking) yields more debt accumulation if and
only if $ >$ / $ (1+D)N /N or D /D>N /N . This condition reduces to (see Appendix E),D ND F D D D D
* * * * *
(5.2)
This condition is certainly met if policymakers' preferences coincide with those of society. An
independent central bank may lead to lower debt accumulation only if it is less conservative than a
dependent central bank sharing the government's preferences (in particular if " <" /(6+1)). In this
BM BF
peculiar case, the government reduces debt to make up for the lack of conservatism of the
independent central bank.
Inflation
In a static model, a more conservative central bank unambiguously enhances price stability.
In a dynamic model, the effects on long-term price stability are less clear because a more
conservative central bank may lead to more debt accumulation, thereby increasing inflationary
pressures in the long run. Indeed, an increase in " (for given " >0) produces not only an
BM BF
intratemporal shift away from inflation towards higher taxes and lower public spending (as in the
static model) but also an intertemporal shift in financing requirement. In particular, if " is not too
BM
high, an increase in " reduces $ , thereby shifting distortionary losses towards the second
BM ND
*
period and thus putting upward pressure on second-period inflation. Appendix F finds that the
intertemporal effect dominates the intratemporal effect, and, hence, results in a higher second-period
inflation only for small values of " . Accordingly, as an instrument to establish long-term price
BM
stability, a more conservative central bank is effective only if it is made conservative enough.
Intuitively, if the central bank attaches a very high weight to price stability, the fiscal authority
does not engage in the strategic accumulation of debt because it realises that the conservative
central bank will barely raise second-period inflation in response to a higher second-period
financing requirement.
21
The result that, for relatively low values of " , a more conservative central bank may raise
BM
long-run inflation is reminiscent of the well known unpleasant monetarist arithmetic (see Sargent
and Wallace, 1981), which implies that a tighter short-run monetary policy may lead to higher
$
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$
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inflation in the longer run. In contrast to Sargent and Wallace (1981), we derive this result as the
time-consistent outcome of an explicitly formulated game between the fiscal and monetary
authorities.
To explore this issue further, we compare the inflation performance under decentralized
discretion with that under centralized commitment (see Section 3) under the assumptions that the
policymakers share society's inflation aversion (i.e. " =" =" ) and that 6<1, which seems
BM BF BS
realistic for modern economies with efficient means of payment and hence low base money
holdings. Under these assumptions, inflation is excessive under decentralized discretion (i.e. it
exceeds the second-best level) in the static version of the model. As a direct consequence, the
government strategically accumulates assets to reduce inflation in the second period. The associated
shift in the financing requirement away from the second period may reverse the result from the
static model that inflation is lowest under centralized commitment. In particular, second-period
inflation is highest under centralized commitment if (see Appendix G)
(5.3)
This inequality is met if the following conditions are met. First, the government should be patient,
so that a large part of the intertemporal financing requirement must be met in first period.
Accordingly, a small shift in financing requirements exerts a major impact on the second-period
inflation rate. The second condition is that the Phillips curve be steep, so that the strategic asset
accumulation is indeed effective in inducing the central bank to raise the second-period inflation
rate. Finally, inflation should account for a relatively large share of the financing requirement so
that a lower second-period financing requirement implies a substantial drop in inflation at that time.
Small inflation aversion, a large preference weight for public spending, and large money holdings
contribute to such a relatively large share of seigniorage. In this connection, inequality (5.3)
suggests that higher second-period inflation under centralized commitment (i.e. unpleasant
monetarist arithmetic) is unlikely to occur in modern economies with small money holdings.
Welfare
To interpret the welfare losses contained in Table 2, we continue to assume that the
policymakers share society's inflation aversion (i.e. " =" =" ) and that 6<1. Accordingly,
BM BF BS
inflation is excessive not only under centralized discretion (see Section 4) but also under
decentralized discretion. The reason is that the distortion due to discretion (i.e. the self-defeating
incentive facing discretionary monetary policymakers to boost output through unanticipated
inflation) dominates the distortion due to decentralization (i.e. an independent central bank ignoring
the beneficial social role of inflation in generating additional seigniorage revenues (which depends
on 6)).
Accordingly, just as under centralized discretion (see Section 4), the inability to commit
18
This expression for the optimal degree of conservatism of an independent central bank coincides with
22
the corresponding expression in the static model.
The price stability weight of the central bank set according to (5.4) ensures that the effective discount
23
rate $ equals the corresponding rate of society $ .ND S
* *
under decentralized discretion results in two sources of additional welfare loss compared to the
second best. The first source, the suboptimal intratemporal allocation of distortionary losses, stems
from inflation being too high compared to the socially optimal inflation rate. The second source,
the suboptimal intertemporal allocation of distortions, originates in the strategic use of the debt
instrument. However, if the fiscal authority is myopic, the strategic effect (which reduces debt
accumulation) offsets political distortions (which raise debt accumulation).
Optimal institutions
Letting the preferences of discretionary policymakers depart from societies' preferences may
enhance welfare by offsetting the distortions associated with discretionary policymaking (see
Rogoff, 1985). In particular, in the absence of political distortions (so that the government shares
society's preferences), a necessary and sufficient condition for establishing the second best is that
the price stability weight of the independent central bank is set according to
22
" = " / " /6. (5.4)
BM BM BS
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An optimally designed independent central bank thus results in an optimal allocation of distortions
not only intra- but also intertertemporally. Intuitively, the incentive facing the first-period fiscal
authority to use debt policy strategically originates in the inability to commit monetary policy in
the second period. If this problem is removed by properly adjusting the preferences of the central
bank, the fiscal authority no longer perceives any need to employ debt policy strategically in order
to move second-period monetary policy closer to the social optimum. Indeed, correcting monetary
23
policy preferences is a direct way to eliminate the distortions due to the inability to commit.
Decentralized decisionmaking with an independent central bank facilitates optimal
institutional design. In particular, with an independent central bank, the preferences of the
government do not need to diverge from society's preferences. With centralized discretionary
policymaking (i.e. a dependent central bank), in contrast, the government should not only be more
impatient and conservative than society but also should even be more conservative than the
optimally designed independent central bank (see Section 4, in particular, compare (5.4) with (4.5)).
The presence of political distortions complicates the optimal institutional design. In this
case, granting an independent central bank the proper degree of conservatism (i.e. setting "
BM
according to (5.4)) is no longer sufficient for attaining the second-best. Intuitively, changing
monetary institutions is not the most appropriate instrument to deal with imperfect fiscal
institutions. Indeed, with political distortions involving the preferences of the fiscal authorities in
19
The optimal debt target puts a limit on debt accumulation or asset accumulation, depending on whether
24
" /" <6 or " /" >6 (if $ =$ ), or whether $ <$ or $ >$ (if " /" =6).
BF BM BF BM F S F S F S BF BM
Indeed, compared to monetary institutions, fiscal institutions are much closer to the day-to-day political
25
process. Hence, in practice, it may be impossible to deal with political distortions by imposing debt ceilings or
by correcting the preferences of the government.
Recall that in a static model the price stability weight of the government does not affect the equilibrium.
26
Hence, in a static context the second best can be attained by setting the price stability weight of the
independent central bank according to (5.4).
addition to distortions due to the inability to commit monetary policy, the second best can be
established only by employing two instruments, each targetted at one of the distortions. In
particular, the second best is established by, first, properly designing monetary institutions to
address the distortions due to discretionary policymaking (i.e. setting " =" /6) and, second,
BM BS
imposing an optimal debt target (given by (3.9)) to address the political distortions. This explains
24
why the Delors Report (1989) on the design of monetary and fiscal institutions in the EMU
emphasises the importance of debt ceilings as complements to a conservative, independent central
bank.
To further explore the significance of debt ceilings, we investigate what happens if only
monetary institutions can be designed optimally. In that case, the second best can not be attained.
25
Moreover, monetary institutions can no longer be targetted only at ensuring the optimal inflation
rate, because they have to bear also the burden of dealing with political distortions. Indeed,
eliminating the inflationary bias of discretionary policymaking by properly adjusting the price
stability weight of the central bank worsens fiscal distortions due to myopic fiscal policymakers.
To explore these complications in more detail, we first consider the case where the
government shares society's inflation aversion, but is myopic ($ <$ ). In that case, the optimal priceF S
stability weight of the central bank, " , trades off inter- and intratemporal distortions and lies
BM
opt
between the weight " (0<" <" /6) that minimizes the intertemporal loss factor and the weight
BM BM BS
E E
" /6 that minimizes the intratemporal loss factor (see Appendix H1). Accordingly, the central bank
BS
should be made less conservative than in the case of a benevolent fiscal authority in order to
encourage the myopic fiscal authority to restrain debt accumulation so as to enhance the credibility
of monetary policy. In this way, the need to alleviate political distortions distracts monetary policy
from its primary mission of ensuring price stability. This explains why central bankers are strong
advocates of instruments dealing more directly with fiscal myopia, such as ceilings on fiscal debt in
the context of the EMU.
We now turn to the case of a fiscal authority who shares society's time preference rate but
who is opportunistic (i.e. " <" ). In that case, whereas monetary distortions are eliminated (i.e.
BF BS
26
intratemporal losses are minimized) if " =" /6, fiscal distortions are taken away (i.e.
BM BS
intertemporal losses are minimized) if " =" /6. The optimal degree of central bank conservatism
BM BF
trades off additional intra- and intertemporal losses. Whereas " >" /6, it cannot be ruled out
BM BF
opt
that " >" /6 (see Appendix H2). This can be illustrated with the special case where the fiscal
BM BS
opt
20
authority does not care at all about inflation, i.e. " =0. In that case, $ is monotonically
BF ND
*
increasing in " , but never exceeds $ (at which value for $ the intertemporal component of
BM S ND
* *
welfare losses is minimal). Accordingly, whereas increasing the price stability weight of the central
bank from " =" /6 does not produce any first-order effects on the intratemporal component of
BM BS
opt
the welfare loss, it still yields first-order reductions in the intertemporal component of the welfare
loss. This implies that " >" /6. Intuitively, the central bank needs to be made more
BM BS
opt
conservative than in the second best in order to act as a counterweight against the extremely
opportunistic fiscal authority.
6. Conclusions
This paper investigated how the strategic interaction between monetary and fiscal
authorities impacts debt policy. If a centralized, benevolent policymaker sets all policy instruments,
the inability to commit produces welfare losses that are due not only to the usual intratemporal
inflation bias but also to excessive accumulation of assets. With monetary policy decentralized to
an independent central bank, the conflict between this central bank and the government about future
monetary policy induces the government to use debt strategically. In the absence of political
distortions, a properly designed conservative, independent central bank is sufficient to establish the
second best. With an opportunistic or myopic government, however, these monetary institutions
need to be supplemented by an optimal debt target in order to attain the second best. If myopia in
fiscal policy cannot be corrected by a debt target, a conservative central bank may be
counterproductive in that it leads to excessive debt accumulation. This provides a rationale for the
public debt criterion in the Maastricht Treaty as a supplement to an independent European Central
Bank, which gives priority to price stability.
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Table 1: Policy outcomes under various regimes
Policy variable: first period (r=C,D,ND) second period (r=C,D,ND)
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d N.A.1
Regime (r) T T T $
Br Jr gr r
*
C $ / $C F
* *
D $ / $ D /DD F
* * *
ND $ / $ N /NND F D D
* * *
Note: 1. Subscript r (= C, D or ND) indicates the policy regime: C = centralized
commitment, D = centralized discretion, ND = Nash discretion.
2. N.A. = not applicable.
3. Note that T +T +T = 1, for r = C, D or ND.
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Table 2: Welfare losses under various regimes
Policy welfare loss: optimal preferences:
regime:
C $ =$ , " ="F S BF BS
D
ND $ =$ , " =" /6F S BM BS
Note: For definitions, see Table 1.
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Technical appendices
A: Derivation of equilibrium policies under centralized commitment.
The equilibrium is derived by working back in time and solving for the optimal policies given the
current value of the state variable (public debt) and given that future policies are optimally selected.
Substitute (2.1) into (2.3) (for t=2) and impose B =B , so that the second-period Lagrangian of the2 2
e
fiscal authority can be written as,
£ = ½[" B + (<J +x ) + " (g -g ) ] + 8 [g +(1+D)d -J -6B ], (A.1)
BF 2 2 2 gS 2 2 2 2 1 2 2
2 2 2
where 8 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government budget constraint in the second period.2
The first order conditions (given the linear-quadratic specification of the problem, the first order conditions
are necessary and sufficient for the optimum) for B , J and g are given by, respectively,2 2 2
" B = 8 6, (A.2)
BF 2 2
<(<J +x ) = 8 , (A.3)2 2 2
" ( g -g ) = 8 , (A.4)gS 2 2 2
Eliminate 8 from the system (A.2)-(A.4) to obtain:2
B = (6 < /" )(J +x /<), (A.5)2 BF 2 2
2 2
g -g = (< /" )(J +x /<), (A.6)2 2 gS 2 2
2
Combine (A.5) and (A.6) with the government financing requirement (2.7) for period 2, to obtain the second-
period policy outcomes for given value of d :1
(A.7)
(A.8)
(A.9)
where P/6 /" +1/< +1/" . Substitution of (A.1)-(A.3) into the fiscal authority's welfare loss function (and2 2
BF gS
imposing B =B ), yields a second period welfare loss of ½P [ K +(1+D)d ] .2 2 2 1
e -1 2
Therefore, if we substitute (2.1) into (2.3) (for t=1) and impose B =B , the first-period Lagrangian of1 1
e
the fiscal authority can be written as,
£ = ½[" B + (<J +x ) + " (g -g ) ] + ½$ P [ K +(1+D)d ] +
BF 1 1 1 gS 1 1 F 2 1
2 2 2 -1 2
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8 [g +(1+D)d -J -6B -d ], (A.10)1 1 0 1 1 1
where 8 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government budget constraint in the first period. The1
first order conditions for B , J , g and d are given by, respectively,1 1 1 1
" B = 8 6, (A.11)
BF 1 1
<(<J +x ) = 8 , (A.12)1 1 1
" ( g -g ) = 8 , (A.13)gS 1 1 1
$ P [ K +(1+D)d ](1+D) = 8 . (A.14)F 2 1 1
-1
Combine (A.11)-(A.13) with the government financing requirement (2.7) for period 1, to yield
<(<J +x ) = P [ K +(1+D)d -d ]. (A.15)1 1 1 0 1
-1
Combine (A.12), (A.14) and (A.15) to give
[ K +(1+D)d -d ] = $ (1+D)[ K +(1+D)d ]. (A.16)1 0 1 F 2 1
Equation (A.16) can be rewritten as,
d = [$ (1+D)+1] {[ K +(1+D)d - K ]+(1-$ ) K }, where $ /$ (1+D). (A.17)1 F 1 0 2 F 2 F F
* -1 * *
Substitute (A.17) into (A.15) and rewrite to give the equilibrium tax rate in period 1,
(A.18)
Similarly, substitute (A.17) into (A.8) and rewrite to give the equilibrium tax rate in period 2,
(A.19)
It can be easily verified that (A.18) and (A.19) coincide with the corresponding "compressed" expressions
presented in Table 1. The expressions for the other policy variables can be found in a similar way using the
first-order conditions for the policy instruments in the first and the second period.
B: Proof of (4.2), the condition under which second period inflation is
lower with centralized discretion than with centralized commitment.
Using Table 1 and the assumption that the authorities' price stability weights coincide with society's,
we find that second-period inflation is lower with centralized discretion than with centralized commitment if
and only if,
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(B.1)
Divide both sides by the right hand side of (B.1) to yield (4.2).
C: Derivation optimal debt target under centralized discretion.
The optimal debt target follows immediately from the minimisation (over d ) of1
D: Derivation of the equilibrium policies under decentralized discretion.
The central bank and the fiscal authority play a Nash game in the first and second period. The
central bank chooses the inflation rate taking as given the fiscal authority's policy choices and taking as given
the expected inflation rate. The fiscal authority selects the J and g in period 2, taking as given B and B ,2 2 2 2
e
and J , g and d in period 1, taking as given B and B .1 1 1 1 1
e
In period 2 the central bank selects B to minimize the expression ½[" B +(<(B -B -J )-x ) +" (g -2 BM 2 2 2 2 2 gS 2
2 e 2
g ) ]. The first-order condition yields the central bank's reaction function,2
2
B = < (" +< ) (B +J +x ). (D.1)2 BM 2 2 2
2 2 -1 e
The second period Lagrangian of the fiscal authority is,
£ = ½[" B + (<(B -B -J )-x ) + " (g -g ) ] + 8 [g +(1+D)d -J -6B ], (D.2)
BF 2 2 2 2 2 gS 2 2 2 2 1 2 2
2 e 2 2
where 8 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government budget constraint in period 2. The first2
order conditions for J and g are, respectively,2 2
-<(<(B -B -J )-x ) = 8 , (D.3)2 2 2 2 2
e
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" ( g -g ) = 8 , (D.4)gS 2 2 2
Impose rationality of expectations B =B upon (D.1) and (D.3) and combine the resulting expressions and2 2
e
(D.4) with the government financing requirement (2.7) for period 2, to yield
<(<J +x ) = N [ K +(1+D)d ], (D.5)2 2 D 2 2
-1
where N /6/" +1/< +1/" . Hence, using (D.1) (B =B ), (D.3) and (D.4), we arrive at,D BM gS 2 2
2 e
(D.6)
(D.7)
(D.8)
Substitution of (D.6)-(D.8) into the fiscal authority's welfare loss function yields a second period welfare loss
of ½(N /N )[ K +(1+D)d ] , where N /" /" +1/< +1/" .D D 2 1 D BF BM gS
* 2 2 * 2 2
In the first period, the central bank selects B to minimize the expression ½[" B +(<(B -B -J )-1 BM 1 1 1 1
2 e
x ) +" (g -g ) ]. The first-order condition yields the central bank's reaction function,1 gS 1 1
2 2
B = < (" +< ) (B +J +x ). (D.9)1 BM 1 1 1
2 2 -1 e
The first-period Lagrangian of the fiscal authority is,
£ = ½[" B + (<(B -B -J )-x ) + " (g -g ) ] + ½$ (N /N )[ K +(1+D)d ] +
BF 1 1 1 1 1 gS 1 1 F D D 2 1
2 e 2 2 * 2 2
8 [g +(1+D)d -J -6B -d ], (D.10)1 1 0 1 1 1
where 8 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government budget constraint in period 1. The first1
order conditions for J , g and d are given by, respectively,1 1 1
-<(<(B -B -J )-x ) = 8 , (D.11)1 1 1 1 1
e
" ( g -g ) = 8 , (D.12)gS 1 1 1
$ (N /N )[ K +(1+D)d ](1+D) = 8 . (D.13)F D D 2 1 1
* 2
Impose rationality of expectations B =B upon (D.9) and (D.11) and combine the resulting expressions and1 1
e
(D.12) with the government financing requirement (2.7) for period 1, to yield
<(<J +x ) = N [ K +(1+D)d -d ]. (D.14)1 1 D 1 0 1
-1
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Impose rational expectations (B =B ) on (D.11) and substitute (D.14) into the resulting expression for (D.11)1 1
e
to yield N [ K +(1+D)d -d ]=8 . This can be substituted into (D.13) to giveD 1 0 1 1
-1
[ K +(1+D)d -d ] = $ (1+D)(N /N )[ K +(1+D)d ], (D.15)1 0 1 F D D 2 1
*
Equation (D.15) can be rewritten as,
d = [$ (1+D)+1] {[ K +(1+D)d - K ]+(1-$ ) K }, where $ /$ (N /N ). (D.16)1 ND 1 0 2 ND 2 ND F D D
* -1 * * * *
Substitute (D.16) into (D.14) and rewrite to give the equilibrium tax rate in period 1,
(D.17)
Similarly, substitute (D.16) into (D.7) and rewrite to give,
(D.13)
It can be easily verified that (D.17) and (D.18) coincide with the corresponding "compressed" expressions
presented in Table 1. The expressions for the other policy variables can be found in a similar wayu using the
first-order conditions and the central bank's reaction functions in the first and second period.
E: Proof of (5.2), the condition under which centralized discretion leads
to less debt accumulation than decentralized discretion.
Note that debt accumulation is decreasing in the "effective discount factor", i.e. in $ in the case ofD
*
centralized discretion and in $ in the case of decentralized discretion. Hence, centralized discretion leads toND
*
less debt accumulation than decentralized discretion if and only if D /D>N /N . This is equivalent to
* *
D D
Working out the products (treating (1/< +1/" ) as a single term), cancelling the term (1/< +1/" ) on both2 2 2gS gS
sides, bringing all terms on the right hand side to the left hand side and rearranging yields (5.2):
Note that both terms on the left hand side equal zero if " =" /(6+1) and are negative if 0<" <" /(6+1).
BM BF BM BF
F: Behavior of second-period inflation as function of " for given " .
BM BF
Second-period inflation can be written as,
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Differentiate the first factor between brackets with respect to " , to yield,
BM
(F.1)
Expression (F.1) is positive for 0#" <{[$ (1+D)" ]/[(1+$ (1+D))(1/< +1/" )]} and negative for " >
BM S BF S gS BM
* * 2 ½
{[$ (1+D)" ]/[(1+$ (1+D))(1/< +1/" )]} . Hence, B reaches a global maximum at " = " /S BF S gS 2 BM BM
* * 2 ½ *
{[$ (1+D)" ]/[(1+$ (1+D))(1/< +1/" )]} .S BF S gS
* * 2 ½
G: Proof of (5.3), the condition under which (for 6<1) second period inflation
is lower with decentralized discretion than with centralized commitment.
Assume that 6<1. Using Table 1 and the assumption that the authorities' price stability weights
coincide with society's, we find that second period inflation is lower with decentralized discretion than with
centralized commitment if and only if,
Divide by (6-1) (<0) to give,
(G.1)
Divide both sides by the right hand side of (G.1) to yield (5.3).
H: Optimal central bank weight in the presence of political distortions.
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One can write society's welfare loss as
L L F , (H.1)A E
2
where
(H.2)
(H.3)
Let us first establish some properties of L , the intratemporal component of the welfare loss, and L ,A E
the intertemporal component of the welfare loss.
Differentiate L with respect to " , to yield,A BM
(H.4)
Hence, L is decreasing (increasing) for " < (>) " /6 so that it reaches its global minimum at " =" /6.A BM BS BM BS
Differentiate L with respect to " , to yield,E BM
(H.5)
The first factor between square brackets on the right hand side of (H.5) is negative (positive) if $ < (>) $ .ND S
* *
Furthermore,
(H.6)
which is negative for values of " #2" /6.
BM BF
H1: Proof that " <" <" /6 if $ <$ and " ="
BM BM BS F S BF BS
E opt
(where " >0 is defined as the value of " which minimizes the intratemporal loss factor).
BM BM
E
The proof consists of the following steps, in which we show that: (i) L reaches its global minimumE
31
at " =" , where 0<" <" /6; (ii) L is decreasing for " #" and L is decreasing for " <" , hence
BM BM BM BS A BM BM E BM BM
E E E E
there exists a value of " >" , such that society's welfare loss is lower than for any 0<" #" ; (iii) L ,
BM BM BM BM E
E E
when evaluated at " =" /6, is increasing and is lower than when evaluated at any other " >" /6. Given
BM BS BM BS
that L reaches a global minimum for " =" /6 (the minimum is interior, hence the slope of L is flat atA BM BS A
" =" /6 and, hence, there are no first-order effects on L of a change in " when evaluated at " =" /6),
BM BS A BM BM BS
it then follows that " <" <" /6.
BM BM BS
E opt
Step (i): Remember that for " #" /6=" /6, $ is decreasing in " . At " =" /6, $ =$ <$ .
BM BF BS ND BM BM BS ND F S
* * * *
Moreover, $ goes to infinity as " approaches zero from above. Hence, by continuity, there is a (unique)ND BM
*
value of " , denoted by " , between 0 and " /6 at which $ =$ . L reaches its global minimum at
BM BM BS ND S E
E * *
$ =$ , hence at " =" .ND S BM BM
* * E
Step (ii): Because " <" /6, it follows immediately that L is decreasing for " #" . Moreover, we have
BM BS A BM BM
E E
seen that $ is decreasing for " <" /6=" /6, hence, by the definition of " , $ >$ for " <" .ND BM BF BS BM ND S BM BM
* E * * E
Hence, for " <" , ML /M$ >0 and M$ /M" <0, and, hence, ML /M" <0.
BM BM E ND ND BM E BM
E * *
Step (iii): Remember that at " =" /6, $ =$ <$ , and, hence, ML /M$ <0 at " =" /6. Remember also
BM BS ND F S E ND BM BS
* * * *
that $ is decreasing at " =" /6. Therefore, ML /M" >0 at " =" /6. Furthermore, N /N =1 atND BM BS E BM BM BS D D
* *
" =" /6, while N /N <1 for " >" /6, as is easy to check. Hence, for " >" /6, $ <$ <$ . Because L
BM BS D D BM BS BM BS ND F S E
* * * *
is monotonically decreasing in $ for $ <$ , L when evaluated at " =" /6 (hence $ =$ ) must beND ND S E BM BS ND F
* * * * *
lower than L , when evaluated at some " >" /6.E BM BS
H2: Proof that " >" /6 if " <" and $ =$ .
BM BF BF BS F S
opt
Because " <" , $ >$ =$ for " #" /6. Also, because " <" , M$ /M" <0 for " #" /6.
BF BS ND F S BM BF BF BS ND BM BM BF
* * * *
Hence, L is decreasing for " #" /6. Finally, because " <" , L is decreasing for " #" /6. Hence, L LE BM BF BF BS A BM BF A E
is decreasing for " #" /6 and, hence, the optimal inflation weight of the central bank is greater than " /6
BM BF BF
(and potentially infinitely large).
